Estimate: | £700 - £1,000 |
Hammer price: | £600 |
SCHMIDT, Paul-Otto (1899-1970). Hitler's Interpreter ... Edited by R. H. C. Steed. London: William Heinemann, 1951. 8vo (213 x 135mm). Half title, half tone portrait frontispiece of the author, 10 full-page half tone illustrations. Original red buckram, spine lettered and ruled in gilt (gilt faded, corners lightly rubbed, some very light staining, without the dust-jacket). Provenance: Anthony Eden, 1st Earl of Avon (modern armorial bookplate loosely-inserted). FIRST ENGLISH AND ABRIDGED EDITION, A HIGHLY IMPORTANT COPY, ANNOTATED AND HIGHLIGHTED IN PENCIL BY ANTHONY EDEN THROUGHOUT. For example, the front free endpaper is inscribed by Eden in pencil: "Sent to me by Schmidt. A.E." (although the author has not signed or inscribed the copy); on p.24 (commenting on the printed passage 'At noon [?on March 26, 1935] there were refreshments at the British Embassy at which Hitler made an appearance; this was the first time that he had been seen at a foreign embassy'), Eden writes: "No - two years earlier where he met me"; on p.86 (referring to Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to Germany from 1937-39): "& yet he was pathetically pro-German"; on p.57 (commenting on the printed passage 'Lloyd George took this opportunity of expressing himself very definitely, if in quite general terms, about the German peace efforts, "which," he said, "have unfortunately been frustrated by the staff talks"'): "he was against them"; on p.88 (the context unclear): "Strange. The [?]Govt. thought they had had a success"; on p.107 (commenting on the printed line 'It was at this moment that the decision in favour of peace was made'): "Hitler had won"; on p.131 (commenting on the printed passage 'Throughout the summer [of 1939] tension in Europe increased daily. Preparations for war were put in hand more or less openly in every country; menaces, warnings, and challenges filled the ether and the columns of the Press'): "Yet [Sir John] Simon persuaded the Cabinet to lay down no [?]destroyers. What did that cost in lives?"; on p.150 (commenting on the printed passage 'In this critical discussion [Sir Nevile Henderson] would have been able to express himself with more clarity and ease in English'): "Foolish"; on p.235 (commenting on the printed line referring to 'the Pact concluded by Soviet Russia with Yugoslavia just before the outbreak of war with that country and Germany'): "It always puzzled me why Stalin did this. I asked him and he replied that they felt sympathy with Yugo & that they knew by then that they would be attacked anyway. The coup d' etat we organised in Belgrade may therefore have helped the German Russian breech"; and on p.237 (commenting on Pearl Harbour and Germany's declaration of war on the United States): "It was a turning point of the war because it made possible a U.S. western strategy." The rear endpapers are filled with Eden's pencil notes referring to various pages in the book, and, occasionally, with his commentary on them [see illustration]; for example: "Page 64. Proof once again of what I told Neville: that Mussolini had already done a deal with Hitler - March 1937 - I put it later. P.211. Date of Hitler's decision to attack Russia ... Page 237. Astonishing that Germans did not know in advance of Pearl Harbour ... Page 265. Morgenthau Plan at Quebec, which I [?]opposed on my arrival before [Cordell] Hull came & to W's [Winston's] exasperation." Schmidt opens his book with the printed sentence: "The first time I interpreted for Hitler was on March 25, 1935, when Sir John Simon and Mr Anthony Eden came to Berlin for talks on the European crisis caused by German re-armament." On pp.18-19, he goes on to give a more detailed printed account of the first meeting of Simon (then British Foreign Minister) and Eden (then Lord Privy Seal) with Hitler in the Reich's Chancellery: "Simon, with his large brown eyes, looked at Hitler with by no means unsympathetic interest as he listened to him. His face naturally expressed a certain paternal benevolence ... On the other hand, I occasionally noticed a rather more sceptical expression flit over the face of Eden, who understood enough German to be able to follow Hitler more or less. Some of Eden's questions and observations showed he had considerable doubts about Hitler and what he was saying. 'There are actually no indications,' he once observed, 'that the Russians have any aggressive plans against Germany.' And in a slightly sarcastic tone he asked: 'On what are your fears actually based?' 'I have rather more experience in these matters than is general in England,' Hitler parried, and added heatedly, throwing out his chin: 'I began my political career just when the Bolshevists were launching their first attack in Germany.' Then he went off again into a monologue on Bolshevists individually and in general which, with translation, lasted until lunch." The editor R. H. C. Steed's printed preface to the book provides an assessment of its author's character and motivations: "... Schmidt saw ... that between hommes de bonne volonté, men of good will, regardless of nationality, even the greatest difficulties could be overcome. Twenty years of unique experience of diplomacy in its most intimate top-level aspect confirmed this opinion, and added to it the conviction that 'the real enemies of mankind are the fanatics, in whatever camp they may be'. Schmidt is at pains to make it clear that he places the Nazis in that category - especially Hitler and Ribbentrop. He is damning and often contemptuous in his judgments of the men for whom he worked so loyally and for so long - and has been criticised on that account. He claims that he was never a Nazi sympathiser, that he merely did his job as a civil servant and expert technician, that he made no secret of his independent outlook and that this was duly noticed against him in his dossier. This account of himself seems to be borne out by the impression he made, among others, on Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin until the outbreak of war. He certainly showed considerable courage of a negative kind in that, despite his very special position, he resisted pressure to join the Nazi Party until 1943 ... I think Schmidt might fairly be described as an enlightened, cosmopolitanised German nationalist, and find it a little hard on him that we have to hand him down to posterity as 'Hitler's Interpreter' and not, perhaps more aptly, as 'Stresemann's Interpreter' - a title to which he has at least an equal claim."